On March 23, President Donald Trump announced that the United States and Iran had reached “major points of agreement”. Shortly after, he claimed that Tehran had delivered a significant concession related to oil, gas, and the Strait of Hormuz . These statements, along with the decision to postpone strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure, generated considerable diplomatic optimism. Global markets responded positively to what was perceived as a sign of de-escalation. This optimism, however, conflates two analytically distinct phenomena: the emergence of a mutually hurting stalemate , which creates the conditions under which parties become willing to negotiate, and the existence of a viable bargaining architecture, which determines whether durable agreements can be reached. In the current conflict, the former is beginning to crystallise while the latter remains structurally absent. The stalemate condition American scholar William Zartman ’s concept of the mutually hurting stalemat...
US PRESIDENT Donald Trump ’s climb-down from his 48-hour ultimatum to Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz should come as no surprise. His persistent inconsistency makes such reversals unsurprising. His claims of “very strong talks” with Iran have been firmly denied by Tehran. He extended the deadline by another five days, hoping Iran would yield. However, there is no indication that the Islamic Republic — having endured more than three weeks of devastating strikes by the US in coordination with Israel — is prepared to surrender. Trump’s latest claim that the US and Iran are negotiating a “total resolution of our hostilities in the Middle East” may have briefly eased international oil and gas prices . Still, it lacks plausibility given that hostilities have not ceased. Mere exchanges of messages between Tehran and Washington through a third country cannot be construed as serious negotiations. Despite the decapitation of its ...